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Abstract 
‘The land question’ in South African national politics continues to dominate party-
political battles. However, most of these battles refrain from engaging with ‘communal’ 
landholdings that are under the custodianship of traditional leaders. Of further 
concern, the legislation not only remains ambiguous about traditional leaders’ land 
administration functions and powers, but it is also conceptualised within Western 
frameworks. Ambiguity and Western centricity, in turn, hinder planning efforts and 
municipal service delivery in South Africa’s rural regions, while residents continue to 
live without tenure security and enhanced socio-economic prospects. By focusing on 
‘communal land’, this article revisits African indigenous land laws, in order to gain a 
deeper understanding of contemporary tenure practices on ‘communal’ landholdings. 
The article identifies some of the planning complexities found in former Transkei. 
Possible recommendations include following an area-based approach to planning 
where community property associations (or similar structures) are explored with 
residents of some ‘communal’ landholdings, while traditional leadership structures are 
explored in other contexts. All role players should thus have equal decision-making 
powers over local land administration and development.
Keywords: ‘Communal land’, traditional leaders, rural planning, tenure insecurity 
’n ONDERSOEK NA SOMMIGE BEPLANNINGSKOMPLEKSITEITE VAN 
‘GEMEENSKAPLIKE GROND’ IN DIE VOORMALIGE TRANSKEI
In die Suid-Afrikaanse nasionale politiek oorheers ‘die grondvraag’ steeds party-politieke 
gevegte. Die meeste van hierdie gevegte skram egter weg van die ‘gemeenskaplike’ 
grondbesittings wat onder toesig van tradisionele leiers is. Verdere kommer is dat 
wetgewing nie net dubbelsinnig is oor die funksies en bevoegdhede van tradisionele 
leiers se grondadministrasie nie, maar dit word ook binne Westerse raamwerke 
gekonseptualiseer. Dubbelsinnigheid en Westerse sentraliteit belemmer op hul beurt 
die beplanningspogings en munisipale dienslewering in Suid-Afrika se landelike 
streke, terwyl inwoners voortgaan om sonder verblyfreg en beter sosio-ekonomiese 
vooruitsigte te leef. Deur op ‘kommunale grond’ te konsentreer, word hierdie inheemse 
grondwette in Afrika heroorweeg om ’n dieper begrip te kry van hedendaagse 
verblyfreg op ‘gemeenskaplike’ grondbesittings. Die artikel identifiseer sommige van 
die beplanningskompleksiteite wat in die voormalige Transkei gevind is. Moontlike 
aanbevelings sluit in dat ’n gebiedgebaseerde benadering tot beplanning gevolg word 
waar gemeenskaps-eiendomsverenigings (of soortgelyke strukture) ondersoek word 
met inwoners van sommige ‘gemeenskaplike’ grondbesittings, terwyl tradisionele 
leierskapstrukture in ander kontekste ondersoek word. Alle rolspelers moet dus gelyke 
besluitnemingsbevoegdhede oor plaaslike grondadministrasie en ontwikkeling hê.
Sleutelwoorde: ‘Gemeenskaplike grond’, landelike beplanning, onveiligheid in 
verblyfreg, tradisionele leiers
HLAHLOBO EA A MANG 
A MATHATA A TLISOANG 
KE MERALO EA LEFATSHE 
SEBAKENG SA TRANSKEI 
EA MEHLENG 
Taba ea lefatshe naheng ea Afrika 
Borwa e tsoela pele ho nka maemo a 
pele likhohlanong tse teng lipakeng tsa 
mekha ea lipolotiki. Le ha hole joalo, 
likhohlano tsena hali na tabatabelo ea 
ho fumana maikutlo a baahi ba lulang 
metseng e busoang ke marena. Se 
tshoenyang ke hore molao oa naha ha o 
hlakise ka botlalo maikarabelo le matla a 
marena mabapi le tsamaiso ea lefatshe. 
Ka nqa e nngoe, molao o ikamahanya le 
mekhoa ea linaha tsa mose, ‘me hona 
ho sitisa tsoelopele e ka tlisoang ke 
limmasepala tsa metse ea mahaeng a 
Afrika e Borwa. Molemong oa kutloisiso 
e batsi, sengoliloeng sena se lekola 
mekhoa e neng e sebelisoa nakong e 
fetileng tsamaisong ea lefatshe metseng 
e mahaeng. Se boetse se shebisisa 
mathata a tobaneng le thero ea lefatshe 
Transkei ea mehleng. Likeletsong tse 
fanoeng, sengoli se bontsha molemo 
oa thero ea lefatshe e ikamahanyang le 
semelo sa sebaka seo, e kenyeletsang 
maikutlo a bohle ba amehang, ‘me bohle 
ba nka karolo liqetong tse nkuoang 
mabapi le lefatshe la mahaeng.
1. INTRODUCTION
The Economic Freedom Fighters’ 
(EFF) successful political campaign to 
mobilise land as a symbol of colonial 
and apartheid theft has placed 
‘the land question’ at the centre of 
South Africa’s party-political battles 
(Kepe & Hall, 2018). For the EFF, 
the ruling African National Congress 
(ANC) has failed to address this 
theft, thereby fuelling their calls 
for “the land to be nationalised 
and returned to the black African 
majority [via] expropriation without 
compensation” (EFF, 2019: 9). 
Expropriation without compensation, 
in turn, necessitates amendments 
to Section 25 of the Constitution of 
South Africa (RSA, 1996). Yet, during 
these strident political confrontations 
over land ownership, the topic of 
‘communal land’ – which is officially 
state-controlled trust land – hardly 
ever surfaces as a matter of urgent 
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concern. Said differently, and in the 
words of a research participant:
The many debates in parliament 
are all about commercial farms 
and private landholdings. But we 
are failing to deal with ‘communal 
land’. We must first address this 
issue before we can talk about land 
expropriation without compensation. 
We can run away from this issue, 
but this will only exacerbate 
existing problems in South Africa’s 
rural regions (Shasha, 2019: 
personal interview).
At least 17 million South Africans 
live on ‘communal’ landholdings 
that are under the jurisdiction and 
custodianship of approximately 
800 traditional leaders (Oomen, 2005; 
Branson, 2016).1 Most of this land, 
however, continues to be held in 
trust by the state, which is a remnant 
of the 1936 Native Trust and Land 
Act. While this Act was repealed 
in 1991, residents of ‘communal’ 
landholdings continue to live without 
tenure security (Du Plessis, 2011). 
Neither they nor traditional leaders 
officially own the land. As residents of 
‘communal’ landholdings occupy and 
use land under a system of rights that 
is conveyed through oral traditions, 
this land is neither documented nor 
registered under the formal cadastre 
(Hull, Sehume, Sibiya, Sothafile 
& Whittal, 2016). Residents are, 
therefore, not formally recognised 
as legal land-rights holders; hence, 
their tenure insecurity. Furthermore, 
while ‘communal’ landholdings 
are under the custodianship of 
traditional leaders, their functions 
and powers regarding rural land 
1 Bennett (2004) is highly critical of the ongoing 
use of terms such as ‘communal land’ and 
‘communal tenure’ in contemporary land reform 
and planning legislation, since such terms are 
derived from colonial common-law practices 
that negate existing realities. While I support 
Bennett’s criticism, as it fails to unshackle 
us from Western conceptualisations of land 
ownership, for analytical purposes alone, I will 
continue to use these terms as they refer to 
a specific type of landholding that is held in 
trust by the state under the custodianship of 
traditional leaders. But I will do so by placing 
these terms in inverted commas to signify their 
problematic nature.
administration2 remain undefined, 
despite the fact that institutions of 
traditional authorities are recognised 
in the Constitution (RSA, 1996), 
the Traditional Leadership and 
Governance Framework Act 
(RSA, 2003), and the Spatial 
Planning and Land Use Management 
Act (SPLUMA) (RSA, 2013). To 
worsen matters, “land administration 
[in South Africa’s rural regions] 
was officially haltered by the state 
in 1996 without repealing the 
legislation governing land allocations” 
(Coleman, 2019: personal interview; 
cf. also Hull et al., 2016). Legal 
ambiguity over who controls 
‘communal’ landholdings and land-
allocation functions is hampering 
planning efforts and municipal 
service delivery in South Africa’s rural 
regions. Here too we encounter rapid 
rural densification (Wotshela, 2018). 
However, this type of densification is 
different from processes emerging 
in Asia, where rural regions are 
becoming high-density zones 
of industrial ventures in place of 
small-scale agrarian activities 
(Mughal, 2018; Tan & Ding, 2008). 
By contrast, over 50% of South 
Africans living on ‘communal’ 
landholdings depend on state-issued 
social grants as their main source 
of income, while supplementing 
this income with subsistence 
farming practices (Budlender, 
Mgwebe, Motsepe & Williams, 2011; 
Ntingi, 2016). Of further concern, 
the idea of ‘rural planning’ seems to 
be counterproductive to the state’s 
post-agrarian vision (as explained 
later). Instead, the state seems 
to be influenced by global trends 
and the policies of multilateral 
organisations that have turned 
their focus to urbanisation and the 
unprecedented growth of cities in 
the global South via programmes 
including the United Nations’ 
Sustainable Development Goals and 
the New Urban Agenda. While an 
2 As explained by Hull et al. (2016), rural 
land administration encompasses four 
main components, namely the allocation 
of land parcels to potential rights-holders; 
demarcating land boundaries; the legal 
mechanisms used to solve land boundary 
and land-use conflicts, and establishing land 
tenure security as a result of the outcomes of 
the first three components.
urban focus is important, it should not 
result in diminished rural attentions. 
Nor should planners establish 
unhelpful urban-rural binaries, for 
urbanisation in the South African 
context tends to be cyclical and not 
linear in nature (as discussed later).
By focusing on ‘communal land’ 
in the former Transkei (of the 
present-day Eastern Cape province 
of South Africa), this article aims to 
explore some of the complexities 
concerning ‘the land question’ that 
are seemingly bypassed by the 
state and its political opponents. 
Here, institutional uncertainties 
and municipal service backlogs are 
most acute (Gobeni, 2019: personal 
interview). As a result of dysfunctional 
state structures, traditional 
leaders continue to perform land-
administration functions, even 
if they are not legally mandated 
or supported to do so.
A study conducted by Hawkins & 
Associates in 1980 estimated that 
80% of the total land mass of the 
Transkei comprised ‘communal’ 
landholdings, while urban land 
occupied only 1.3% (Hawkins & 
Associates, 1980). Within these 
‘communal’ landholdings, conditional 
tenure permits were issued to 
residents via Permission to Occupy 
(PTO) certificates (Hawkins & 
Associates, 1980). PTO certificates 
entailed, and continue to entail, 
only a use right, thereby making 
PTOs a less secure form of 
tenure than freehold or quitrent 
tenure rights (Hull et al., 2016).3 
Furthermore, 80% of the total 
land mass of the former Transkei 
remains designated as ‘communal 
land’, despite a quarter of a century 
of post-apartheid governance 
(Coleman, 2018; cf. Figure 1).
The former Transkei comprises 
portions of five District Municipalities 
(DMs) that represent some of the 
worst-resourced councils in the 
country (Coleman, 2018: online). 
DMs are further divided into Local 
Municipalities (LMs) that bear 
3 The system of issuing PTOs is still active 
in some of South Africa’s rural regions, 
despite being abolished by the state in 1994 
(Hull et al., 2016).
8
SSB/TRP/MDM 2019 (75)
responsibility for municipal services 
and local development (cf. Figure 2).
But these responsibilities are 
curtailed by an insignificant tax 
base, since residents of ‘communal 
land’ are precluded from paying 
municipal rates and taxes 
(Tobia, 2019: personal interview). 
As a consequence, LMs rely 
almost exclusively on national and 
provincial government disbursements 
to implement planning projects 
and engineering infrastructure 
(Bennett, Ainslie & Davis, 2013).
Research findings presented in this 
article are based on case study 
research methods that include 
participant observations and ten 
in-depth interviews with directors 
and senior officials of planning and 
engineering departments at DMs and 
LMs, a retired official, a traditional 
leader, two planning consultants, 
a professor of history based at the 
University of Fort Hare, and a focus 
group interview with community and 
economic development officials. 
Archival research methods are 
also used to access historical 
records. The overarching aim 
of this research is not only to 
explore some of the complexities 
of planning on ‘communal land’ in 
the former Transkei, but also to 
demonstrate the predominantly 
Western focus of South African land 
laws that continue to inhibit more 
creative responses to everyday 
rural realities. This Western-centric 
concern is relevant to planning, 
for it has an impact on the lives 
of a significant number of rural 
residents who continue to engage 
in aspects of precolonial tenure 
practices, regardless of the 
insidious land laws passed under 
colonialism and apartheid.
This article is structured in three 
parts. It begins by revisiting African 
indigenous land laws, in order to 
gain a deeper understanding of 
contemporary tenure practices 
on ‘communal’ landholdings. 
The focus then shifts to current 
planning complexities in the 
former Transkei, before turning 
to possible recommendations.
2. LAND TENURE REVISITED
Land tenure reform was, and 
remains, a key policy concern in 
South Africa. Accordingly, the 1997 
White Paper on South African Land 
Policy explicitly sought to address 
tenure reform by recommending a 
unified system of land rights, while 
recognising residents’ de facto 
rights on ‘communal land’. It also 
recommended the transfer of state-
controlled trust land to individuals or 
communities via a Western land titling 
approach. The idea of extending 
private landownership rights to rural 
residents on either an individual or 
a group-held basis found further 
expression in the promulgation of the 
Figure 1: ‘Communal land’ in the Eastern Cape (illustrated in dark 
grey). ‘Communal land’ boundaries correspond with the 
boundaries of the former Transkei (east of the Great Kei 
River) and the former Ciskei (west of the Great Kei River)
Source: Adapted from Coleman, 2018: online
Figure 2: District and Local Municipalities of the Eastern Cape 
Source: Map drawn by the author, 2019
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Communal Land Rights Act of 2004 
(RSA, 2004). If group-held ownership 
rights were sought for ‘communal’ 
landholdings, these landholdings 
would be administered and managed 
by traditional leaders (RSA, 2004). 
However, in 2010, the Communal 
Land Rights Act was deemed to be 
unconstitutional, due to a procedural 
technicality. Nevertheless, its 
uncritical subscription to Western 
land titling approaches is reiterated 
in SPLUMA (RSA, 2013) and 
its accompanying regulations 
(RSA, 2015). “Most of the legislation 
[thus remains] very European 
in its approach, and it fails to 
incorporate existing tenure systems 
on ‘communal land’ [that predate 
the colonial era]” (Koetze, 2019: 
personal interview). This claim is 
corroborated by a planning consultant 
(Jonas, 2019: personal interview).
2.1 African indigenous land laws
For scholars of African indigenous 
land laws, the idea of absolute 
ownership is an inappropriate 
resolution to the complex 
tenure practices found on 
‘communal land’ (Bennett, 2004; 
Claassens, 2014; Du Plessis, 
2011; Lavigne Delville, 2007; 
Meinzen-Dick & Mwangi, 2009; Mnisi 
Weeks, 2018; Okoth-Ogendo, 2008). 
Absolute ownership, they argue, 
ignores residents’ multiple land 
interests, and the embedded and 
overlapping nature of indigenous 
tenure systems that partially survived 
the insidious land laws passed 
under colonialism and apartheid.
Over three decades ago, Okoth-
Ogendo (1989: 7) argued that it is 
futile to explain African indigenous 
land laws from a Western epistemic 
that directs enquiry into “whether or 
not African social systems recognise 
institutions of ownership; and if they 
do, who in society – the chief, the 
family, the clan, or the lineage – is the 
repository of that ownership”. Instead, 
Okoth-Ogendo (1989; 2008) as 
well as Winkler and Duminy (2016) 
suggest that planners explore the 
meaning and nature of property 
in African onto-epistemologies, 
by asking meta ethical questions 
such as, for example: What is the 
meaning and nature of property 
in land in African socio-political 
orders? For Okoth-Ogendo (2008), 
the meaning and nature of property 
in African onto-epistemologies is 
derived not only from how individuals 
or groups relate to a physical place, 
but also from how individuals relate 
to all members of a community and 
vice versa. What this sociopolitical 
order then establishes is not a 
property right over a specific parcel 
of land, but rather a set of reciprocal 
rights and obligations that bind 
together and confer power over land 
in community members (Winkler 
& Duminy, 2016). Reciprocal and 
obligatory rights are understood 
as a continuous performance and 
not as a finite action, as found 
in Western landownership laws 
(Bennett, 2004; Hull et al., 2016). 
This continuous performance of 
reciprocal and obligatory rights 
determines who may have access to 
land and its associated resources. 
This alternative conceptualisation 
of property in land also determines 
who controls and manages 
associated resources on behalf of 
those who have access to the land. 
A conceptual distinction is, therefore, 
drawn between the manner in which 
access to land is obtained, and the 
manner in which land resources 
are controlled and managed 
(Cousins, 2007; Claassens, 2014).
2.2 Access and control under 
indigenous land laws
“Access to land is essentially a 
function of membership in the family, 
clan, lineage or wider community, 
and it is available to any individual 
on account of that membership” 
(Okoth-Ogendo, 2008: 100). 
This membership-based access 
is maintained through active 
participation in the production and 
reproduction of the sociopolitical, 
economic and spatial organisation 
of a community. Since individuals 
engage in a range of production 
and reproduction activities within 
a community, rights of access 
encompass multiple phenomena. 
Put differently, “individuals, 
families or lineages could each 
simultaneously hold a bundle of 
access rights” that are embedded 
and overlapping in nature (Okoth-
Ogendo, 2008: 100, my emphasis).
Control, on the other hand, occurs 
primarily for the purpose of securing 
access rights to land (Cousins, 2007). 
This control is typically vested 
in, and exercised by the political 
authority of the wider community 
(Okoth-Ogendo, 2008). However, 
this authority is not monolithic 
in nature, but rather segmented 
both vertically and horizontally. 
To illustrate the segmented nature 
of land administration in indigenous 
land laws, Okoth-Ogendo (2008) 
suggests imagining an inverted 
pyramid, where the tip of the 
inverted pyramid represents a 
household’s control over cultivation 
and residential land use. The centre 
of the pyramid represents the 
clan’s or lineage’s control over land 
designated for grazing, hunting or 
other socio-economic activities, while 
the base of the inverted pyramid 
represents the wider authority 
that is responsible for territorial 
expansion, defence mechanisms, 
socio-economic sustainability, and 
settlement dispute resolutions. 
Controlling and managing land 
resources are then not the purview 
of a singular authority, as is the 
case in Western models of land 
administration (Claassens, 2014; 
Mnisi Weeks, 2018). Rather, these 
functions are shared and distributed 
across all three layers of the 
inverted pyramid, since households, 
clans, and the wider authority all 
respond to issues of land allocation, 
distribution, and sustainable resource 
management. Furthermore, this 
mode of land administration is 
purposefully designed to secure 
individuals’ tenure rights by virtue of 
their membership in a community. 
These principles encompass useful 
frameworks for understanding how 
land-tenure systems functioned, 
and continue to function, to some 
degree, thereby prompting scholars 
to argue for the inclusion of aspects 
of these principles in contemporary 
land-tenure policies (Bennett, 2004; 
Cousins, 2007; Okoth-Ogendo, 2008; 
Du Plessis, 2011; Claassens, 2014).
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2.3 Precolonial land tenure in 
the former Transkei
Okoth-Ogendo’s (1989; 2008) 
precolonial land-tenure thesis 
is supported by anthropological 
and historical evidence found 
in the former Transkei (Hunter, 
1936; Hammond-Tooke, 1968; 
Peires, 1982; Soga, 2013). 
In this instance, membership in a 
community was essential to tenure 
security, while control over land 
administration was layered in nature. 
The principle that bound members 
of a community together was the 
recognition of a chief who was either 
a member of, or a descendant from a 
royal family (Delius, 2008). The base 
of Okoth-Ogendo’s inverted pyramid 
was thus occupied by chiefs and their 
council of elders who often conferred 
with all members of a community 
(Hunter, 1936). Larger chiefdoms 
were divided into wards (iziphaluka) 
consisting mainly, but not exclusively 
of kin who lived together in localised 
areas, and whose land resources 
were administered by subordinate 
headmen (Hammond-Tooke, 1968). 
Wards, therefore, resembled Okoth-
Ogendo’s intermediary layer of 
political authority. Still, it is important 
to re-emphasise that control over 
cultivated lands and homesteads 
(umzi) remained vested in individual 
households (Hunter, 1936; Mager 
& Velelo, 2018). Grazing land was 
accessible to all livestock owners. 
In addition to wider administrative 
functions, chiefs were also 
responsible for initial land allocations 
(Hammond-Tooke, 1968). If a 
household necessitated additional 
land for residential use, they 
approached the headman of the 
ward to allot this land (Delius, 2008). 
Among the amaPondo of the 
present-day Eastern Cape, married 
women selected their own fields for 
cultivation. Once they had turned 
over the soil, they had an exclusive 
access right over these fields 
(Hunter, 1936). The only restriction 
to this right was ensuring non-
encroachment on someone else’s 
cultivated fields. It was thus unusual 
for chiefs to reclaim land or to deny 
members of a community access to 
land (Mager & Velelo, 2018). Those 
who did so for unjustifiable reasons, 
lost support and followers, since 
“the right to depose unjust rulers was 
an integral part of indigenous Xhosa 
political culture” (Peires, 2014: 17).
2.4 Colonial and apartheid 
land tenure
However, the initial assimilationist 
policies of the British Cape Colony 
sought to promote individual tenure 
throughout the annexed chiefdoms 
of the Ciskeian and Transkeian 
territories (Mager & Velelo, 2018). 
Former chiefdoms west of the 
Great Kei River were, accordingly, 
subdivided, surveyed, and sold 
by the Crown as freehold farms 
to anyone who could afford the 
asking price, including wealthier 
refugees from vanquished chiefdoms 
(Wotshela, 2018). In addition to 
selling conquered lands to White 
settlers and a few Black elites, 
the colonial government also 
sought – via the Natives Locations 
and Commonage Act of 1879 – to 
transform rural settlement patterns 
into ‘organised’ and spatially 
‘acceptable’ villages, where 
nuclear families would live on 
subdivided residential plots with 
annually renewable quitrent titles 
(Wotshela, 2014; 2018). This Western 
planning logic, however, failed to 
respond to existing tenure practices 
and livelihood strategies. Regardless, 
and with the promulgation of the Glen 
Grey Act in 1894, quitrent tenure 
was extended east of the Great 
Kei River to nine of the twenty-six 
magisterial districts of the Transkeian 
territories (Coleman, Wotshela, 2019: 
personal interviews). In this instance, 
26 594 quitrent titles were registered 
with the Surveyor General’s Office, 
but many more applications were 
never processed, because quitrent 
title deeds were only issued 
after surveying costs were paid 
(Cousins, 2007; Wotshela, 2014). 
The bulk of the remaining land 
within the Transkeian territories was 
classified as ‘communal tenure’ under 
the 1879 Act. A considerable portion 
of this land was never surveyed, 
and it remains unsurveyed to this 
day (Hull et al., 2016). Instead, it 
was designated as a ‘native reserve’ 
under the Union government’s 
Native Trust and Land Act of 1936, 
which resolved to turn the ‘native 
reserves’ into state-controlled 
trust land under the control of the 
South African Native Trust (SANT) 
(Du Plessis, 2011). Residents thus 
became trust tenants on ‘communal 
land’, while freehold and quitrent 
tenure rights were no longer available 
to them in accordance with the 
1936 Act (Claassens, 2014).
Under the apartheid government, 
the SANT was renamed the 
South African Development Trust 
(SADT). Control over this land 
remained vested in the state. 
As such, the Bantu Authorities Act 
of 1951, which governed SADT 
land, did not confer landownership 
rights to traditional leaders (Mager & 
Velelo, 2018). Rather, it delineated 
a ‘tribal’ authority’s area of political 
jurisdiction and granted this authority 
some land-administration duties 
(Delius, 2008). Many traditional 
leaders, however, interpreted these 
duties as their right to allocate land 
(De Wet, 1989). Instead of following 
the convoluted land-allocation 
process set out in the 1951 Act, 
the vast majority of the traditional 
leaders allocated land directly 
to residents (Ntsebeza, 2008). 
As a result, many residents never 
received formal PTO certificates 
(Cousins, 2007; Wotshela, 2018).
Regardless of informal land-allocation 
practices, further entrenchments 
of institutionalised segregation 
came via the implementation of 
Proclamations 31 and 264 of 
1939, 116 of 1949, and R188 of 
1969, which collectively imposed 
strenuous regulations on ‘communal 
land’, including the segregation of 
residential activities from agricultural 
and grazing activities, the fencing 
off of agricultural land, a ‘one-man-
one-plot’ condition, and restricted 
plot sizes (Wotshela, 2018). These 
Proclamations were also engineered 
to systematically eliminate all 
quitrent rights by replacing 
these tenure rights with PTOs 
(Cousins, 2007). According to one 
research participant, many of these 
Proclamations are “vicious pieces 
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of legislation that remain in use in 
the former Transkei, since they were 
never repealed” (Coleman, 2019: 
personal interview).4 It should also 
be noted that, with the promulgation 
of the Bantu Self-Government Act 
in 1959, the ‘native reserves’ were 
converted into four ‘homelands’ 
(Transkei, Ciskei, Bophuthatswana, 
and Venda), and six ‘self-governing 
territories’ (KwaNdebele, QwaQwa, 
Gazankulu, Lebowa, KwaZulu-Natal, 
and KaNgwane). ‘Homelands’ and 
‘self-governing territories’ remained 
state-controlled trust landholdings 
under SADT (Du Plessis, 2011: 45).
3. UNDERSTANDING THE 
CURRENT COMPLEXITIES 
OF ‘COMMUNAL LAND’ IN 
THE FORMER TRANSKEI 
A history of colonial conquest, violent 
land expropriation and segregationist 
laws has left indelible marks on 
South Africa’s rural landscape (Mager 
& Velelo, 2018). Land administration 
has, for the most part, collapsed in 
South Africa’s rural regions: PTOs 
may or may not be issued; registers 
of rights holders are seldom updated, 
and land allocation takes place on an 
ad hoc basis without legal security 
(Cousins, 2007). Despite, or perhaps 
because of defunct government 
systems, “indigenous norms and 
structures in relation to property have 
demonstrated great resilience in the 
face of colonial and post-colonial 
policies” (Cousins, 2007: 292). 
While there are dangers in 
abstracting institutional concepts from 
specific moments in history – for such 
abstractions might become prone 
to essentialist understandings that 
are inconsistent with contemporary 
and ever-fluid practices in rural 
settings – Cousins (2007), 
nevertheless, posits that conceptual 
understandings of indigenous land 
laws remain relevant, because such 
understandings might allow planners 
to critically interrogate Western-
legal forms of private property.
4 The Constitution states that existing laws 
will remain in force until they are replaced by 
appropriate legislation.
3.1 Inadequate planning 
legislation 
Yet, as mentioned earlier, 
SPLUMA (RSA, 2013) assumes 
a taken-for-granted norm that 
land is owned in accordance 
with Western conceptualisations 
of property, and bounded.
The first two questions of 
any planning application are: 
Who owns the land? And, where 
are the boundaries? Well, 
on ‘communal land’ there 
aren’t any answers to these 
questions. So, you can’t make 
a planning application if you’re 
on ‘communal land’. SPLUMA 
simply excludes ‘communal’ land 
rights holders, and Schedule 
2 of SPLUMA [which refers to 
land use categories] completely 
ignores what is happening on 
‘communal land’ (Coleman, 2019: 
personal interview).
Key assumptions about absolute 
ownership remain unchallenged, 
while “communal land administration 
– from a development control 
perspective – is still a taboo subject, 
because of the contradictions found 
between ‘communal’ tenure practices 
and the SPLUMA expectations” 
(Tobia, 2019: personal interview). 
Moreover, taken-for-granted norms 
preclude any acknowledgement 
of, or means to address ongoing 
tenure insecurity. This preclusion 
surfaces most acutely when it 
comes to municipal service delivery, 
planning, and agrarian development 
(Coleman, Gobeni, Sako, 2019: 
personal interviews). SPLUMA 
also uncritically accepts the spatial 
demarcation of traditional councils 
as established by the 1951 Bantu 
Authorities Act and reinforced via the 
Traditional Leadership Framework 
Act (RSA, 2003). However, areas 
under the jurisdiction of contemporary 
traditional councils hardly ever 
align with established municipal 
boundaries (Koetze, 2019: personal 
interview). Traditional leaders are, 
therefore, obliged to navigate the 
planning and budgetary priorities 
of multiple local municipalities 
(Moshoeshoe, 2019: personal 
interview), while ward councillors 
need to deliberate with different 
traditional leaders over service 
delivery and development proposals 
(Bennett et al., 2013). Of equal 
concern, contentious landownership 
issues remain unresolved 
(Oomen, 2005), thus creating in 
the minds of municipal officials, 
traditional leaders and residents 
alike an incorrect presumption that 
“communal land is owned by the 
chiefs” (Gobeni, 2019: personal 
interview). This misunderstanding 
of landownership persists, despite 
Deputy President Mabuza’s 
statement to the National Assembly 
in May 2018 that “insecure 
land tenure emanates from 
the false view that land under 
traditional leadership is owned 
by traditional leaders” (Mabuza, 
cited in Mnisi Weeks, 2018: 3). 
On the whole, SPLUMA is 
vehemently criticised by agrarian, 
land and legal scholars for 
devolving too many powers to 
traditional councils (Claassens, 
2014; Hall & Kepe, 2017). Yet, 
and somewhat ironically,
[t]raditional leaders are [also] 
very resistant to accept SPLUMA, 
because they believe that it 
will take away their land. As 
planning officials, we want to 
work with traditional leaders. But 
they don’t trust us, because of 
SPLUMA (Gobeni, 2019: personal 
interview).
Unlike the acclaim SPLUMA receives 
in urban contexts, its relevance 
in rural settings remains doubtful. 
“SPLUMA seems to be geared only 
[towards] urban planning, and it 
bypasses rural development needs” 
(Koetze, 2019: personal interview). 
Regardless of a perceived urban 
bias, Regulation 19 of SPLUMA 
(RSA, 2015) recommends that 
traditional councils enter into 
“service level agreements with local 
municipalities” for the purpose of 
“outsourcing some planning functions 
to traditional councils”. But SPLUMA’s 
regulations refrain from explicitly 
stating which planning functions may 
be outsourced. Of further concern, 
traditional councils are excluded from 
planning and land-use management 
decisions in accordance with the 
Constitution (RSA, 1996) and the 
SPLUMA regulations (RSA, 2015). 
It is this decision-making exclusion 
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that traditional leaders find most 
unpalatable (Moshoeshoe, 2019: 
personal interview). To engender 
further confusion, the regulations 
go on to suggest that, if traditional 
councils choose not to engage 
in service level agreements, 
they are then responsible for 
land allocation, thereby nullifying 
any need to engage in a service 
level agreement in the first place 
(Nogcinisa, 2019: personal interview). 
3.2 Duplicated functions and 
ineffective ward councillors 
A general lack of clarity and guidance 
found in the planning legislation 
serves only to create untenable 
situations, in which municipal 
officials, elected ward councillors, 
and traditional leaders are constantly 
embroiled in ‘conflicting rationalities’, 
to use Watson’s (2003) argument, 
while residents continue to live with 
inadequate services, without tenure 
security, and without prospects 
for enhanced socio-economic 
opportunities. At least two officials 
from different municipalities cite 
cases where traditional leaders 
have deliberately hindered the 
implementation of infrastructure 
projects (Gobeni, Nogcinisa, 2019: 
personal interviews), while a different 
rationality reveals that municipal 
budgeting priorities are often 
ignorant of residents’ livelihood 
strategies and everyday hardships 
(Moshoeshoe, 2019: personal 
interview). “We just have to 
endure the pain of living without 
infrastructure and services, because 
things are done via budgets and 
without consultation. But we are here 
to assist the municipality as much 
as we [can]” (Moshoeshoe, 2019: 
personal interview). Furthermore, a 
lack of clarity regarding traditional 
leaders’ precise duties vis-à-vis 
ward councillors’ duties is creating 
factionalised insurrections at the 
expense of collective action.
Ward councillors are constantly 
fighting with traditional leaders, 
because of a duplication of 
duties. But there is no need for 
many different meetings, or for 
fighting that ends up in doing 
nothing for the community. We 
all need to discuss the same 
issues under one roof and take 
these issues forward to the 
municipality, so that they are 
in the municipality’s Integrated 
Development Plan (IDP). But 
fighting is dividing the community, 
because some members support 
the traditional leadership, 
while others support the ward 
councillor (Moshoeshoe, 2019: 
personal interview).
“Duplicated – in fact, quadruplicated 
– functions are not only inefficient; 
they are also a waste of money” 
(Coleman, 2019: personal interview). 
A duplication of duties and functions 
is equally found between DMs and 
LMs, and between municipalities, 
provincial and national tiers of 
government, thereby adding layers 
of bureaucracy to an already 
ineffective planning system.
The biggest problem is that 
you’ve got Local and District 
Municipalities, provincial 
and national departments of 
government all doing the same 
thing. These different departments 
and municipal structures are 
supposed to communicate with 
each other and align their ideas in 
municipal Integrated Development 
Plans (IDPs) and Spatial 
Development Frameworks (SDFs). 
But, they don’t (Koetze, 2019: 
personal interview).
To engender further inefficiencies, 
many ward councillors are failing 
to fulfil their ‘developmental’ and 
‘participatory’ mandates – as 
envisaged in the Municipal Systems 
Act (RSA, 2000) – and this failure 
culminates in a loss of confidence 
in their abilities, since residents 
tend to “trust traditional leaders 
more than the ward councillors” 
(Nogcinisa, 2019: personal interview).
Ward councillors don’t report to 
communities on municipal projects, 
and they don’t come back to the 
municipality and report on what is 
happening on ‘communal land’. 
Also, if chiefs call a community 
meeting, people come. There’s 
respect for the chief. When ward 
councillors call a meeting, people 
don’t attend (Nonkula & Skhosana, 
2019: personal interview).
3.3 Self-serving political 
directives
Officials are also often encumbered 
by irrational and self-serving political 
directives that obviate and override 
established plans. To be clear: 
“The political leadership [of the 
municipality] wants immediate action, 
and because of this they ignore our 
spatial plans” (Nogcinisa, 2019: 
personal interview). “Our elected 
municipal councillors simply 
go ahead and make decisions 
without consulting our IDPs and 
SDFs” (Gobeni, 2019: personal 
interview). Since it appears that 
“elected councillors are blinded 
by political ambition” (Koetze, 
2019: personal interview), when 
officials provide technical reasons 
for why certain interventions 
might not be feasible, they are 
perceived as “frustrating the political 
administration of the municipality” 
(Sako, 2019: personal interview). 
By contrast, “traditional leaders are 
not swayed by party politics. They 
are there for the people all the time” 
(Sako, 2019: personal interview).
Elected municipal councillors’ 
poor performance may further 
be attributed to their inability, 
or unwillingness, to engage in 
debates concerning agricultural 
development, since, as argued 
by Ainslie and Kepe (2016), their 
post-agrarian standpoints conform 
to the state’s ‘modernisation via 
urbanisation’ rhetoric at the expense 
of investing in small-scale agricultural 
developments. This rhetoric is 
confirmed by the planning director at 
a DM who is critical of “the National 
Development Plan (NDP) [which 
assumes] that South Africa will be 
80 percent urbanised by 2030” 
(Shasha, 2019: personal interview). 
Scant results from interventions such 
as the Rural Agro Industrialisation 
and Finance Initiative (RAFI) – which 
was launched in the Eastern Cape in 
2017 for the purpose of supporting 
smallholder farmers – serve only 
to galvanize the state’s myopic 
standpoint that investments in 
urban economies are more fruitful 
than rural planning (Nonkula 
& Skhosana, 2019: personal 
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interview). Traditional leaders, on 
the other hand, recognise the fact 
that processes of urbanisation 
in South Africa are not linear in 
nature, namely that rural residents 
migrate to urban centres and never 
return to their ancestral homes 
(Moshoeshoe, 2019: personal 
interview). Many residents do 
return. If they choose not to return 
for economic or other reasons, 
they still tend to maintain some 
social or spiritual connection to their 
rural homes (Moshoeshoe, 2019: 
personal interview). Accordingly, 
traditional leaders see value in 
prolonged state support for small-
scale agricultural activities, even if 
results from RAFI-type investments 
take longer than originally 
anticipated (Moshoeshoe, 2019: 
personal interview).
3.4 Land administration vacuum 
In 2009, the National House of 
Traditional Leaders was endorsed 
by the state to establish Provincial 
Houses of Traditional Leaders in 
all six of the nine provinces where 
traditional authorities are formally 
recognised. The Eastern Cape 
House of Traditional Leaders 
(ECHTL) is assigned an annual 
budget of approximately R9 million, 
in order to facilitate and implement 
the findings from six committees, 
including the indispensable Rural 
Development and Agrarian Reform 
Committee (Ainslie & Kepe, 2016), 
which is tasked with “providing 
support to government departments 
in the delivery of food security and 
livestock improvement programmes; 
protecting the environment and 
supporting eco-cultural tourism; 
participating in land use management 
programmes; and accelerating the 
involvement of traditional leaders 
in rural development initiatives” 
(Ainslie & Kepe, 2016: 27). However, 
as argued by Ainslie and Kepe 
(2016), it remains unclear how, 
when, and by whom these tasks 
will be operationalised. And since 
traditional leaders are excluded 
from municipal planning tribunals, 
it also remains unclear how they 
are supposed to participate in 
land-use management programmes 
for the purpose of accelerating 
rural development initiatives.
There is no link between the 
local authority and the traditional 
authority, because the law doesn’t 
allow us to recognise traditional 
authorities as decision-makers. 
Traditional authorities feel that 
our SDFs, IDPs, et cetera are 
imposed on them because they 
are excluded from the planning 
tribunals. They should be part 
of these tribunals, because 
the minute you are part of the 
tribunal you are part of the 
decision-making structure. 
Traditional authorities are 
actually regulating and facilitating 
development on ‘communal land’ 
(Nonkula & Skhosana, 2019: 
personal interview).
Dysfunctional state structures, 
measly state budgets for rural 
development programmes, ineffective 
councillors, a relatively high 
turnover of officials, and a “complete 
vacuum of land administration 
in the Eastern Cape” all serve 
to strengthen traditional leaders’ 
positions, despite their deliberate 
exclusion from formal decision-
making processes (Coleman, 2019: 
personal interview). In fact, traditional 
leaders are “filling the state-created 
vacuum by taking on greater land 
administration roles” (Coleman, 2019: 
personal interview). However,
[t]raditional leaders allocate land 
on an ad hoc basis and without 
consulting the municipality. But 
there are no plans for water 
reticulation, sanitation, electricity, 
roads, schools or clinics. And once 
residents move onto the land, they 
start protesting for services. But 
we have not budgeted for services 
on that land in terms of our IDPs. 
That piece of land might also be 
allocated for future development in 
terms of our SDF. But this doesn’t 
matter. The political leadership 
of the municipality wants us to 
provide services regardless of 
the IDPs or SDFs, so that the 
protests stop (Shasha, 2019: 
personal interview).
Rural landholdings are subdivided 
on an ad hoc basis without any 
recognition of established plans. 
Such ad hoc practices result not 
only in a loss of economically viable 
land, but also in unsustainable rural 
densifications, since ‘communal’ 
landholdings remain attractive to 
residents for economic reasons.
Rapid development on erstwhile 
productive agricultural land is 
resulting in a loss of economically 
viable land. ‘Communal land’ 
continues to be subdivided 
without formal approval, 
and these subdivisions are 
unregistered. This informal 
approach is very attractive to 
residents, because ‘communal 
land’ is free of municipal rates 
and taxes. But this isn’t viable 
from a municipal planning and an 
income-generating perspective 




It would appear that planning in the 
former Transkei has become a futile 
exercise. The pressing issue, as 
argued by Bennett et al. (2013: 37), 
is knowing “how to combine the twin 
goals of land administration and 
local development in institutions 
that are both streamlined and have 
widespread social legitimacy”. 
In response, Bennett et al. (2013: 37) 
suggest that the responsibility for 
both local land administration 
and development be vested in 
decentralised democratic structures 
such as community property 
associations (CPAs), because 
institutions of traditional authorities 
are “incompatible with modernity”. 
Members of a state-endorsed and 
-funded CPA are residents who 
are elected by other residents to 
manage ‘communal’ landholdings 
and negotiate development 
opportunities with a municipality.5 
Yet, Bennett et al. (2013: 37) also 
acknowledge that previous “attempts 
at decentralised control through 
CPAs have largely failed”. Reasons 
for this failure are attributed to a 
lack of ongoing state support for 
CPAs after their initial formulation 
(Kingwill, 2008; Bennett et al., 2013).
5 CPAs are landholding institutions established 
under the Communal Property Associations 
Act of 1996. Beneficiaries of the state’s 
land reform, restitution and redistribution 
programmes who want to acquire, hold and 
manage land as a group can establish legal 
entities, via CPAs, to do so (CLS, 2015).
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4.1 The problem with 
universal solutions
Herein lies a problem that goes 
beyond state support. Scholars 
and policymakers are continually 
searching for universal solutions, 
as epitomized by SPLUMA’s 
(RSA, 2013: Section 3) overarching 
goal, which is to establish “a uniform 
and comprehensive system of 
planning across South Africa”.6 
Universal grammars, however, ignore 
complex historical forces – and 
ever-shifting political alliances – that 
continue to shape South Africa’s 
different geopolitical regions 
(Mbembe, 2001). In other words, 
“there simply cannot be a uniform 
approach for all of South Africa, 
because everywhere is different” 
(Coleman, 2019: personal interview). 
“There is no one-size-fits-all solution” 
(Shasha, 2019: personal interview). 
The problem concerning universal 
solutions applies equally to traditional 
leaders as it does to CPAs.
A system of traditional leadership 
cannot be uniformly applied 
across the country as the state 
is trying to do. There are regions 
where traditional authorities won’t 
work. In the [former] Ciskei, for 
example, it will not work. Once 
the Xhosa Ciskei chieftaincies 
got conquered by the British 
in 1879, there was a complete 
absence of chiefly authority until 
the 1950s when the apartheid 
state reintroduced a ‘tribal’ 
authority system. So, you can’t 
treat the Ciskei as being the same 
as the Transkei, where many 
chieftaincies survived colonization 
and apartheid. And in certain 
areas of the [former] Transkei, 
we simply cannot dismiss 
chieftaincies (Wotshela, 2019: 
personal interview).
4.2 Area-based approach
Since universal solutions will 
continue to produce ineffective 
planning outcomes, alternative and 
situated options need to be explored. 
One such option might include an 
area-based approach to planning, 
where CPAs (or similar structures) 
are explored with residents of some 
‘communal’ landholdings, while 
6 Establishing a uniform system of land rights 
was also recommended in the 1997 White 
Paper on Land Policy (RSA, 1997).
traditional leadership structures 
are explored in other contexts. 
Regardless of residents’ preferred 
option, an area-based approach 
needs to be inclusive of all role 
players during the conceptualisation, 
iteration and implementation phases 
of a local area plan (Winkler, 2017). 
All role players should thus have 
equal decision-making powers. If 
one of the role players includes 
traditional leadership structures, 
planners may need to become 
more respectful of established and 
negotiated processes of local land 
administration and development:
What is often overlooked in 
municipal planning is that 
‘communal land’ systems 
are functional. We assume 
that they are not functional, 
because we don’t participate 
in them. But traditional leaders 
hold public meetings and have 
public participation. They have 
traditional council meetings that 
sit regularly. They have agendas, 
minutes, attendance registers, 
and meticulous record-keeping. 
Traditional leaders also report on 
their meetings to communities 
and the municipality. Their 
system is one of negotiated 
planning. They negotiate 
everything with communities 
before any decisions are made 
(Nonkula & Skhosana, 2019: 
personal interview).
An area-based approach will 
also allow planners to focus 
on local-scale priorities, while 
integrating these into DMs’ and 
LMs’ regional-scale frameworks 
that are currently conceptual in 
nature and devoid of details. “Our 
SDFs are very generic. We need 
detailed plans for local areas” 
(Shasha, 2019: personal interview). 
Such an approach to planning 
may also allow for independently 
generated funds to be earmarked 
for local development needs.
We generate our own funds for the 
community. In our area, we have 
a quarry that is used for building 
roads. We entered into a five-
year contract with a construction 
company that is [excavating] 
that quarry. That money, which 
is R10 000 every month, enters 
into the traditional council’s bank 
account which is controlled by 
the PFMA [the Public Finance 
Management Act of 2010]. We also 
rent land to CellC who has erected 
a cell phone mast on that land. We 
have generated close to R300 000 
from that rent. We plough back all 
of this money into the community 
for development. For example, 
we recently renovated a pre-
school which was so dilapidated 
[that the Provincial] Department 
[of Education] wanted to 
demolish it. But we need that 
pre-school. So, we renovated it 
ourselves (Moshoeshoe, 2019: 
personal interview).
However, an area-based approach 
will not resolve contentious 
landownership issues. Nor 
will it resolve residents’ tenure 
insecurities, dysfunctional state 
structures, inadequate state 
budgets for agrarian development, 
and self-serving political interests. 
Extensive and radical structural and 
legislative transformation is needed 
if policymakers hope to address 
these problems. Nevertheless, 
an area-based approach may 
facilitate alternative outcomes to 
ad hoc subdivisions on ‘communal 
land’, while planning for much 
needed engineering services 
and economic development 
opportunities. Via SPUMA’s ‘service 
level agreements’ – that are devoid 
of clarity, and, as a result, allow 
for situated interpretations – all 
collaborators of an area-based plan 
could negotiate traditional leaders’ 
precise functions and powers 
regarding local land administration 
and development vis-à-vis other 
role players’ functions and powers.
4.3 Rethinking absolute 
ownership
Planners might also need to become 
more sensitive to the fact that 
absolute ownership circumscribes 
existing tenure practices on 
‘communal land’. Instead of asking: 
Who owns the land?, it might be 
more useful to ask: Who owns 
what interest in the land? But this 
question is still framed in terms 
of ownership. Du Plessis (2011), 
therefore, suggests that planners 
ask: In whom, for what purpose, and 
for how long should an allocation 
of power in respect of particular 
aspects of land be made? Current 
planning systems and practices, 
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however, undermine possibilities of 
recognising long-established tenure 
practices on ‘communal’ landholdings 
that include embedded and 
overlapping rights based on interests, 
belonging, participation, flexibility, 
and a continuous performance of 
reciprocity and obligations. Current 
land-use management systems 
and practices are also ignorant of 
conceptual distinctions between 
access to land and control over 
land administration. Furthermore, 
planning laws, theories and practices 
default too quickly to a “rigid divide 
between urban and rural, modern 
and traditional” (Claassens, 2014: 9). 
As a consequence, we have not yet 
disentangled ourselves from Western 
onto-epistemologies (Winkler, 2018), 
while the complexities of planning on 
‘communal land’ remain unresolved.
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